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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of Swiss National Bank interventions, and
news about these interventions, on the intraday volatility of the Swiss franc -
U.S. dollar exchange rate. It extends the existing literature by characterising
the the impact of diﬀerent aspects of central bank interventions, like direction,
size, frequency and time of intervention, on exchange rate volatility. Brieﬂy,
the paper ﬁnds that the eﬀect of intervention on volatility varies depending on
how volatility is deﬁned. Interventions decrease volatility contemporaneously
but this eﬀect is reversed in the two hours afterwards. This relationship
is symmetric with respect to the direction of the intervention, whether they
be buy and sell interventions or with-the-wind and against-the-wind inter-
ventions. Analysis of the volatility and intervention size relationship ﬁnds
that as we move from small to large interventions, the larger interventions
tend to increase volatility relative to small interventions. The frequency of
interventions has a small but positive impact on volatility, and this is under-
scored when the analysis is done by splitting the sample into low, average and
high frequency interventions. The interaction between intervention size and
intervention frequency results in a small positive eﬀect on volatility for the
squared return measure and the absolute return measure and a negative eﬀect
for both the realised volatility measures this eﬀect is negative. As before
the eﬀect of the timing of the intervention varies with the volatility measure.
The relationship is diﬀerent for interventions at diﬀerent times of the day.
For the two realised volatility measures 9am interventions reduce volatility
while for the other two measures the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients have an overall
positive eﬀect increasing volatility. 2pm interventions decrease volatility for
both the squared return measures but increase volatility for both the absolute
return measures. Reuters reports of sell interventions have a signiﬁcant and
lagged negative eﬀect on volatility for the squared return measure and both
the absolute return measures.
∗I would like to thank Kathryn Dominguez, Margaret Bray, Bob Nobay and participants at the
FMG doctoral seminar for their suggestions. Any errors are my own.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the impact of Swiss National Bank (SNB) interventions, and
news about these interventions, on the intraday volatility of the Swiss franc - U.S.
dollar (CHFUSD) exchange rate.
While the eﬀectiveness of interventions is important to policy makers, the con-
sensus on the eﬀectiveness has changed several times over the years. In the early
1970s and early 1980s it was believed that authorities could not aﬀect the exchange
rate while in the late 1970s, late 1980s and the early 1990s the view was that the
authorities should intervene (see review by Sarno and Taylor 2001). Recently, in-
terventions have been frequent for some currencies, like the euro and especially the
yen, but infrequent for other major currencies.
Theoretically there are two standard models describing the eﬀect of sterilised
central bank interventions on exchange rates, the portfolio balance model and the
signalling model. The portfolio balance approach is based on the idea that a
sterilised intervention causes market players to change the composition of their
portfolios by buying or selling foreign assets, which in turn leads to a change in
the relative price of domestic assets and foreign assets i.e. the exchange rate. If
domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes, then sterilised intervention can-
not work via the portfolio balance channel. The signalling model, popularised by
Mussa (1981), takes the view that agents interpret interventions as signals of future
monetary policy i.e. the exchange rate is aﬀected by changes in the expectations of
future variables. For the signalling channel of intervention to work, transparency
of interventions and credibility of the central bank are crucial1. Thus, theoretically
both models (portfolio balance and signalling) predict that sterilised intervention
can be eﬀective.
The empirical literature on the portfolio balance model is not only scarce, but
also ﬁnds very little evidence in favour of the model (exceptions to this are Ghosh
1992, Dominguez and Frankel 1993, Evans and Lyons 2001). This literature pro-
vides little support for signiﬁcant imperfect substitution of domestic and foreign
assets. Empirical evidence on the signalling model is mixed with some evidence
for (Dominguez and Frankel 1993 b, c, Vitale 1999 lists papers which suggest that
central bank interventions are informative about future monetary policy) and some
evidence against (Dominguez 1992, Kaminsky and Lewis, 1996)2. Most of this
evidence is based on low frequency data. Using daily data Chaboud and LeBaron
(1999) study the impact of interventions by the Federal Reserve on trading volume
for dollar-yen and dollar-mark futures markets and ﬁnd a positive correlation be-
tween them. This positive relationship survives even after conditioning for daily
volatility. The eﬀect is stronger for secret interventions but weaker for Reuters
reports about the interventions. Recently, access to disaggregated data on inter-
ventions has made it possible to test the signalling hypothesis within the market
microstructure approach to exchange rates3. In this framework central banks are
1Related to the eﬀectiveness of interventions via the signalling channel is the secrecy puzzle.
The signalling channel should work better under transparency but until very recently interventions
have been secret. This has prompted researchers to suggest that central banks might intervene
secretly if their objectives conﬂict with the fundamental value of the exchange rate (Bhattacharya
and Weller 1997 and Vitale 1999). However, the two papers diﬀer on the concealment of inter-
ventions with Vitale (1999) claiming that the goals of the intervention should never be revealed
while Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) conclude that under certain conditions central banks may
prefer to reveal their objectives.
2Edison 1993 provides a review of the empirical literature on the eﬀectiveness of central bank
interventions. For references to recent low frequency work on the eﬀectiveness of interventions
see Chang and Taylor 1998.
3Prior to this interventions were inferred from changes in international reserves. This is an
inaccurate proxy given that reserves are aﬀected by interest receipts, valuations changes and
sometimes do not include intervention transactions at all
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viewed as informed players in the market and their trades (interventions) are ex-
pected to aﬀect the price (exchange rate) since they reveal this information to the
market. Assessing eﬀectiveness based on central bank proﬁts from intervention,
Goodhart and Hesse (1993) ﬁnd that interventions are proﬁtable in the long run
but not in the short run. Chang and Taylor (1998) examine the eﬀect of Bank
of Japan interventions on the Japanese yen - U.S. dollar (JPYUSD) exchange rate.
They ﬁnd that interventions have a signiﬁcant positive impact on volatility, with
the largest impact 30 - 45 minutes prior to the Reuters news report about the in-
tervention (Reuters reports are used as a proxy for actual intervention)4. The data
set used in the current paper is an improvement on that in Chang and Taylor (1998)
since it consists of actual intervention data from the SNB and Reuters news reports
about these interventions, allowing me to separate the eﬀect of the intervention on
volatility from the eﬀect of the news. In addition to observing signiﬁcant interven-
tion eﬀects on the level of the CHFUSD exchange rate Fischer and Zurlinden (1999)
ﬁnd that the time of the intervention may play an important role in the eﬀectiveness
of the intervention. While they use actual foreign exchange transactions data from
the SNB which include information on the transacted amount, price and time of
day, they do not have exchange rate data to match. So they proxy the change in
the exchange rate by the diﬀerence between the exchange rates of two consecutive
interventions.
Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright (2003) study the eﬀect of macroeconomic an-
nouncements on high frequency exchange rates (dollar-DM, dollar-euro and dollar-
pound) and interest rates. They ﬁnd that “stronger-than-expected” announce-
ments lead to signiﬁcant dollar appreciation. Using data on interest rates and in-
terpreting results in the context of uncovered interest parity, they infer that “such
releases either lower the risk premium for holding foreign currency or imply future
expected dollar depreciation”. Dominguez (2003a) studies intraday and daily ef-
fects of dollar interventions by G3 governments on exchange rate volatility. The
underlying premise in the paper is that heterogeneity in trader’s information can
cause exchange rates to move away from fundamentals in the short run and if these
heterogeneous traders interpret interventions diﬀerently, then interventions might
actually increase volatility in the short run. She ﬁnds that interventions are associ-
ated with increases in intraday and daily volatility, but there is not much evidence
that intervention aﬀects long term volatility. Payne and Vitale (2003) expand on
the results from Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) by including intraday indicative ex-
change rate quotes. They ﬁnd that intervention has signiﬁcant short run eﬀects
on the level of the exchange rate. Additionally, using the absolute value of the
of exchange rate return as a measure of volatility, they ﬁnd that in anticipation of
the intervention and at the time of the intervention volatility increases but starts
decreasing from 15 minutes after and the eﬀect is completely reversed over the next
90 minutes.
This paper extends the existing literature by characterising the impact of central
bank interventions on exchange rate volatility based on diﬀerent aspects of interven-
tions like direction, size, frequency and time of intervention. It asks the questions:
Do interventions have an impact on exchange rate volatility? Do buy and sell in-
terventions have diﬀerent eﬀects on volatility (Direction)? Do larger interventions
mean lower volatility (Size)5? If there is a size eﬀect, is it linear or non-linear? If
4Using SNB intervention data and Reuters reports Fischer (2003) ﬁnds that the latter are not
good proxy for the former and hence Reuters reports need to be used with caution.
5It would not be surprising if there is no size eﬀect given the large daily turnover in foreign
exchange markets. In April 1998 the daily turnover in traditional foreign exchange instruments
(spot, forwards and swaps) was $1.5 billion and in OTC foreign exchange derivatives it was $97
billion. Even though the turnover declined between 1998 and 2001, it was $1.2 billion in traditional
foreign exchange instruments and $67 billion in OTC foreign exchange derivatives. Aprroximately
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central banks do want to intervene, should they do so in one shot or via repeated
interventions (Frequency)? Does one large intervention have a diﬀerent eﬀect than
a set of smaller more frequent interventions i.e. is there any interaction between
size and frequency? Do interventions aﬀect volatility more or less when they are
carried out during periods of high trading volume, for example, market opening and
closing times (Time of intervention)?
The second aspect this paper considers is how markets react to news about
interventions: Does news about interventions calm markets or make them volatile?
Is this news important relative to the actual intervention? If the news report appears
before the intervention, does the actual intervention have any eﬀect? On the other
hand, if the news report appears after the intervention (or is missed), does the
actual intervention have a larger and/or more persistent impact?
To analyse these questions I use an event study methodology and data on the
CHFUSD exchange rate, interventions by the SNB and Reuters reports of these
interventions. As mentioned above this data allows more reliable analysis since I
use actual interventions (and not proxies based on international reserves or Reuters
reports), volatility measures based on changes in indicative quotes of the exchange
rate (and not proxies based on intervention transaction price) and Reuters news
reports that allow me to separate the eﬀect of the intervention on volatility from
the eﬀect of the news.
Brieﬂy, the paper ﬁnds that the eﬀect of intervention on volatility varies depend-
ing on how volatility is deﬁned. Interventions decrease volatility contemporaneously
but this eﬀect is reversed in the two hours afterwards. This relationship is symmet-
ric with respect to the direction of the intervention, whether they be buy and sell
interventions or with-the-wind and against-the-wind interventions. Analysis of the
volatility and intervention size relationship ﬁnds that as we move from small to large
interventions, the larger interventions tend to increase volatility relative to small
interventions. The frequency of interventions has a small but positive impact on
volatility, and this is underscored when the analysis is done by splitting the sample
into low, average and high frequency interventions. The interaction between inter-
vention size and intervention frequency results in a small positive eﬀect on volatility
for the squared return measure and the absolute return measure and a negative ef-
fect for both the realised volatility measures this eﬀect is negative. As before the
eﬀect of the timing of the intervention varies with the volatility measure. The
relationship is diﬀerent for interventions at diﬀerent times of the day. For the two
realised volatility measures 9am interventions reduce volatility while for the other
two measures the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients have an overall positive eﬀect increasing
volatility. 2pm interventions decrease volatility for both the squared return mea-
sures but increase volatility for both the absolute return measures. Reuters reports
of sell interventions have a signiﬁcant and lagged negative eﬀect on volatility for
the squared return measure and both the absolute return measures.
The data are described in Section 2 along with some descriptive statistics on
the exchange rate and the intervention series. Section 3 describes the methodology
brieﬂy, Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The data covers the time period 07 Oct 1986 - 15 Aug 1995 and comprises of three
components. The ﬁrst component of the data consists of intraday indicative quotes
of the CHFUSD exchange rate at a 15 minute frequency and are provided by Olsen
5% of the global transactions in the forex market are accounted for by trading in CHFUSD. This
makes it the fourth most traded currency pair. Source: Pasquariello (2003) and the BIS Triennial
Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity (1999).
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& Associates (Zurich). The second component of the data is the SNB interventions.
These interventions were conducted in the CHFUSD market and are time stamped
to the exact time of the intervention. Also included is information on the size and
direction of the intervention (whether the SNB was buying USD or selling USD)6.
The ﬁnal component of the data is news reports of central bank interventions based
on Reuters headlines7. The interventions and news reports data are aggregated to
15 minute frequency to match the exchange rate data.
A plot of the exchange rate along with the interventions is in Figure 1. Eye-
balling the ﬁgure it appears that the SNB is following an against-the-wind inter-
vention policy for the majority of the time. A plot of the four volatility measures
for an average non-intervention is in Figure 2. It is clear that there is a distinct
intraday pattern in volatility which is motivation for deseasonalising the exchange
rate volatility series before analysing it. I leave that discussion to the methodology
section.
The SNB’s intervention strategy consisted of conducting a number of small in-
terventions in a short period of time and the majority of these were in conjunction
with by the Federal Reserve (Fed) and/or the Bundesbank (Buba). Based on
quotes gathered from commercial banks, SNB interventions were conducted in the
dealer market. And while the SNB informed the counter-party on completion of
the transaction that it was an intervention, it did not publicly declare that it had
intervened8. It is worth pointing out that in any given intervention episode, the
SNB either bought dollars or sold dollars, but never did both. From Table 1 we see
that the SNB intervened 171 times over 97 days. They bought USD on 70 occasions
(over 33 diﬀerent days) and sold USD on 101 occasions (over 64 days). Figures 3
provides further description of the interventions. The SNB intervened more fre-
quently in the early years of the sample but these interventions seem equally spread
out during the week (Figures 3a and 3b). Figures 3c and 3d reiterate the point
that the SNB intervened frequently and in small quantities rather than intervening
a large amount in a single trade. Figure 3e is very interesting since it shows a bi-
modal distribution of interventions by time of day. Interventions are most often at
9am and 2pm GMT (Greenwich Mean Time) and can be interpreted as being timed
to coincide with the opening of the London and New York markets respectively.
These are typically times when trading volumes are high, indicating a possibility
that the SNB might be trying to hide its trades from the market9. At this point it
is worth noting that this data contains no information on whether the intervention
was conducted jointly with another central bank or singly. Any information on
joint interventions was retrieved from Reuters reports.
Reuters news reports have been used in numerous microstructure papers analysing
interventions and are now a standard way of inferring when the market received in-
formation about interventions10. Most of this research assumes that the reports
are released just after the intervention and typically, the time stamp on the report
is taken to be the time the market learned about the intervention. Fischer (2003)
carries out tests of the accuracy of these reports for SNB interventions. He ﬁnds
that there are large prediction errors between Reuters reports and the actual inter-
ventions stemming in part from the fact that it is possible for reports to be released
before the intervention in some cases and after the actual intervention in others.
6An example of a typical data point would be ‘SNB bought US dollars 5 million on 05 June
1990 at 10:49 a.m.’.
7This data is from Kathryn Dominguez and covers headlines on all days when the Federal
Reserve was in the market.
8For a more detailed description of the SNB’s intervention strategy look at Fischer (2003).
9Admati and Pﬂeiderer 1988 and Easley and O’Hara 1987 are examples of microstructure
models that show that informed traders have incentive to trade when volumes are high.
10Goodhart and Hesse 1993, Chang & Taylor 1998, Dominguez 2003 a, b, Payne & Vitale 2003
are some other papers that have used Reuters news reports on interventions.
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So clearly, any results based on these reports must be viewed with caution. Since
the Reuters reports data starts in Sept 1989, only a sub-sample (Sept 1989 - Aug
1995) of the interventions data is used to match the Reuters reports data. Table 3
provides a description of the Reuters reports data11. Reuters reports that the SNB
bought USD on 16 occasions (of which 11 were joint interventions) and sold USD
on 19 occasions (of which 15 were joint interventions). Comparing this with the
information from the SNB it appears that Reuters falsely reports the SNB buying
USD on 5 occasions and misses 28 occasions when the SNB sold USD12.
3 Measuring Exchange Rate Volatility
I use an event study approach to analyse the impact of various intervention char-
acteristics on exchange rate volatility13. I use four diﬀerent measures of volatility
in the analysis. Squared returns, absolute returns and two measures of realised
volatility, sum of the squared returns for the past hour and the sum of the abso-
lute returns for the past hour14. Returns are calculated as the log diﬀerence of
the exchange rate series. There are two points I would like to raise at this stage.
First, given that the realised volatility variable has a lag structure, the independent
variables will have lagged eﬀects on the dependent variable by deﬁnition. Secondly,
it is widely recognised that seasonal patterns exist in high frequency exchange rate
volatility and there is evidence of this in the data used in this paper as well (see
Figure 2). The simplest method to control for seasonality would be to include a
dummy variable for every 15-minute interval in the day15. Instead I use Flexible
Fourier Forms (FFF) to adjust for seasonality16. Intuitively, this method captures
seasonality in a non-linear way by taking combinations of periodic components (sine
and cosine curves) at diﬀerent frequencies. For each 15-minute interval indexed by
‘j’ the volatility seasonal is calculated by estimating the following equation over all
non-intervention days17,
sj = c +
P∑
k=1
[
λ2k−1,j cos k (
2 π j
N
) + λ2k,j sink (
2 π j
N
)
]
(1)
where j = 1,...,96 and N is the number of return intervals per day (96 in this
data).
11An example of a Reuters report - ‘Swiss National Bank buys dollars for francs in concerted
intervention with Fed’.
12It is worth noting here that if there is a report corresponding to the ﬁrst intervention of an
episode it might be possible that the other interventions in the same episode are anticipated by the
market, given the SNB’s intervention implementation technique of small frequent interventions.
So these interventions should be considered as reported even if there are no additional Reuters
reports.
13Time series methods are not built to capture the eﬀects of unequally spaced data like inter-
ventions. Fatum and Hutchinson (1999) argue that the event study methodology is more apt in
this context, where an event is deﬁned as one episode of interventions. Other papers conducting
event studies in this context are Chang and Taylor, 1998, Fischer and Zurlinden, 1999, Payne and
Vitale 2003, Dominguez 2003 a,b.
14 These are standard ways of measuring volatility (used in Payne and Vitale 1999, Dominguez
2003 and Andersen and Bollerslev 1997).
15However this would mean an additional 96 right-hand side variables making computations
slow.
16Other papers using FFF in this context are Andersen & Bollerslev 1997, Payne 1996 and
Dominguez 2003. For a text book description of the method refer to chapter 6 (Spectral Analysis)
in Hamilton 1994.
17I use only non-intervention days to capture the seasonal pattern since volatility on these days
might diﬀer from those on intervention days and I do not want to explain away any intervention
day eﬀects by imputing them in the seasonal. I estimate diﬀerent seasonal components for the
four diﬀerent deﬁnitions of volatility.
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The parameter ‘P’ controls the number of periodic components used18. Figure
2 graphs the average realised volatility pattern on non-intervention days along with
the ﬁtted FFF.
I regress the volatility variable on the estimated seasonal components. The
residual from this regression, which is the deseasonalised volatility, is then used as
the dependent variable for all further analysis. The independent variables are leads
and lags of dummy variables corresponding to the diﬀerent intervention character-
istics.
4 Results
All regressions are run on a sample of 18621 observations spaced at 15-minute
frequency. The data includes all 171 interventions over 97 days in the period Oct
1986 - Aug 1995. These are combined with a control sample of non-intervention
days to give the ﬁnal data set. The control sample was constructed by randomly
choosing a non-intervention day that matched the day of week and the year of a
given intervention day. The regressions were run for four diﬀerent deﬁnitions of
volatility - squared returns, absolute returns, realised volatility based on squared
returns and realised volatility based on absolute returns.19.
4.1 SNB Interventions
The ﬁrst regression aims to conﬁrm that interventions have an impact on exchange
rate volatility. The deseasonalised volatility series is regressed on 8 leads and lags
of an intervention indicator which takes value 1 when there is an intervention (buy
or sell) and is 0 otherwise. The results in Table 4 show that the eﬀect of interven-
tion depends on how volatility is deﬁned. There is a signiﬁcant contemporaneous
negative eﬀect but only when volatility is deﬁned as realised volatility. However, in
the two hours after the intervention we observe that the majority of the signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients are positive indicating an increase in volatility for all the measures.
4.2 Direction
Having established that depending on how you deﬁne volatility interventions volatil-
ity reduces contemporaneously but increases afterwards, I turn to the relationship
between the direction of the intervention and volatility. Do buy interventions have
a diﬀerent impact than sell interventions? In this paper a buy (sell) interven-
tion refers to the SNB buying (selling) USD which would lead to a depreciation
(appreciation) in the CHF.
I test this hypothesis explicitly based on the following regression20.
volt = α +
8∑
j=−8
βj (Bt+j + St+j) +
8∑
k=−8
γk St+k + θ1 volt−1 + θ2 volt−2 + εt
= α +
8∑
j=−8
βj Bt+j +
8∑
k=−8
(βk + γk) St+k + θ1 volt−1 + θ2 volt−2 + εt(2)
18My current results are based on P = 8. Varying P to take diﬀerent values (4, 6, 8, 10) did
not aﬀect the ﬁr of the FFF to the data. Dominguez 2003 uses P = 8 for dem-usd and yen-usd
data for the period Aug 89 - Aug 1995 while Andersen and Bollerslev 1997 use P = 6 for dem-usd
data for the period 1992-93.
19In all the regressions I include two lags of the dependent variable. Newey-West t-statistics
are used to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation usually found in high frequency
ﬁnancial data.
20In later sections, the same speciﬁcation is used to test if other characteristics of interventions
have asymmetric eﬀects on volatility.
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where Bt and St are dummy variables for buy and sell interventions respectively.
Crucially, this regression tests whether γk = 0. A non-zero γk coeﬃcient
implies that buy and sell interventions have diﬀerent relationships with volatility.
The results in Table 5 indicate that almost all the γk are insigniﬁcant, which implies
that buy and sell interventions have similar eﬀects on volatility. The few signiﬁcant
γk coeﬃcients are positive, which means that at these lags sell interventions reduce
volatility by less than buy interventions.
Another interesting directional aspect is whether against-the-wind and with-
the-wind interventions have diﬀerent eﬀects on volatility. Eye-balling Figure 1
and Table 2, it appears that the SNB intervenes against-the-wind more often than
with-the-wind, presumably to calm markets. These indicators are calculated based
on 1 day, 1 week, 2 week and 4 week moving averages. Using a speciﬁcation
similar to Eqn. (2), I ﬁnd that almost all the gamma coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant
implying that against-the-wind and with-the-wind interventions have similar eﬀects
on exchange rate volatility21.
4.3 Size
We now turn to investigating the eﬀect of the size of an intervention on exchange
rate volatility. A priori if we believe that central banks intervene to calm markets
then we would expect the size of the intervention and volatility to be negatively
correlated. On the other hand, it would not be surprising to ﬁnd that central bank
interventions, which are typically small relative to the daily turnover in foreign
exchange markets22, do not aﬀect volatility. Finally, some microstructure models
(Kyle 1985) predict a positive relationship between intervention size and volatility
since the central bank’s (informed trader) demand is expected to move price (the
exchange rate). So, what does the data tell us about the relationship between
intervention size and volatility? Is this relationship linear or non-linear? To this
end I regress the four volatility measures on indicators for intervention, size and
squared intervention quantity. The size indicator variable is equal to the absolute
amount of the intervention when there is one and zero otherwise. The squared
quantity indicator is constructed similarly. The results, presented in Table 6,
show that for the absolute return based volatility measures intervention size has a
lagged negative eﬀect on volatility which would support the idea that central banks
intervene to calm markets. On the other hand, for the realised volatility based on
squared returns there is no eﬀect at all while for the squared return measure the
lagged eﬀect is positive. If we believed that interventions are informative trades
then, we would expect increased volatility as the market absorbs this information.
If we consider the realised volatility measure, we ﬁnd a small, negative eﬀect. So the
eﬀect of the size of an intervention on volatility depends on how volatility is deﬁned.
Looking at the coeﬃcients on squared quantity we see that only a few are signiﬁcant
(at lead 8, contemporaneously and then at lags 5,6) and these are very small. This
might be explained by the much larger scale of squared quantity relative to the
volatility measures. This means that the size eﬀect might be non-linear but that
this non-linearity is small23.
I analyse the volatility and intervention quantity relationship further by estimat-
ing the eﬀect of small, average and large size interventions on volatility24. Results
21Due to constraints of space the results are not presented in the paper.
22Footnote 5 gives information on daily turnover in foreign markets.
23Payne & Vitale 2000 ﬁnd that the size eﬀect on the level of the exchange rate is non-linear
but that this non-linearity is not economically signiﬁcant.
24Small interventions are deﬁned as sales or purchases of up to 5 mil USD, Average interventions
as between 5 and 10 mil USD and Large interventions are those that are larger than 10 mil USD.
With this classiﬁcation there are 27 small, 26 average and 5 large interventions.
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in Table 7 indicate that as we move from small to large interventions the positive
coeﬃcients on interventions decrease and the negative coeﬃcients increase. This
means that larger interventions tend to increase volatility relative to small interven-
tions which is counter intuitive. This could be explained by the market interpreting
larger intervention quantities as the central bank trying to push the exchange rate
unsuccessfully, and this negative signal leads to higher volatility.
4.4 Frequency
Frequency is the next characteristic of intervention we turn to. How is volatility
aﬀected by a continued presence of the central bank in the market relative to a one-
oﬀ trade? The results in Table 8 indicate that the frequency eﬀect diﬀers across
the diﬀerent volatility measures, with more coeﬃcients on frequency signiﬁcant for
squared and absolute return than for both the realised volatility measures. The
sum of the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients is small and positive indicating that more frequent
interventions increase volatility. However, given that the coeﬃcients are very small
this could also be interpreted as the frequency of intervention actually having no
relationship with volatility i.e. that the regression has estimated a signiﬁcant coef-
ﬁcient of zero. Alternatively, it could be caused by the fact that the scale of the
volatility measures is much smaller than that of the frequency variable and hence
the estimated coeﬃcient is small but non-zero. Finally, this might be the result
of some kind of threshold eﬀect i.e. if the central bank is in the market for long,
this could be interpreted positively by the market to mean that the central bank is
determined to achieve its goal or it could be interpreted negatively, sending a signal
that the central bank is in a losing battle. To test this I estimate the eﬀect of low,
average and high frequency interventions using the following speciﬁcation25.
volt = α+
8∑
j=−8
βj It+j+
8∑
j=−8
γj LFt+j+
8∑
k=−8
δk AFt+k+
8∑
l=−8
φl HFt+l+θ1 volt−1+θ2 volt−2+εt
(3)
The results in Table 9 indicate that low frequency interventions have virtually
no eﬀect on volatility while average and high frequency interventions have a small
but signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on volatility. So this would support the view that
the market interprets the continued presence of the central bank in the market as
the central bank ﬁghting a losing battle and this increases volatility.
4.5 Size and Frequency
From Figures 3c and 3d we can see that the SNB’s preferred strategy for intervention
has been frequent interventions of small quantities we are now interested in the
combined eﬀect of the size and the frequency of interventions. In the last two
sections we saw that large size and high frequency intervention episodes increase
volatility, . Practically, we are asking do 5 interventions of USD 10 million each
have the same eﬀect on volatility as one intervention of USD 50 million? The results
of regressing the volatility measure on intervention size, intervention frequency and
a size-frequency interaction term are in Table 10. The sum of the signiﬁcant
quantity coeﬃcients is positive for all except the absolute return measure conﬁrming
again that the larger the intervention, the higher the volatility. Almost all the
frequency coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant. This might be explained by the possibility
25For a given 15 minute interval, the indicator for low frequency interventions takes value 1
when there are between 1 and 6 interventions (44 data points), the average frequency indicator
takes the value 1 when there are between 7 and 12 interventions (12 data points), and the large
frequency indicator is 1 when the SNB intervenes between 13 and 18 times (2 data points).
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that size and frequency are highly correlated and hence are capturing the same
eﬀect. The few size-frequency interaction coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant sum
to give a small positive eﬀect for the squared return measure and the absolute
return measure. This means that for a given intervention size, the higher the
frequency of intervention, the higher the volatility. For both the realised volatility
measures the sum of the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients is negative indicating that for a given
intervention size or intervention frequency, the higher the other characteristic the
lower the volatility. So using the realised volatility measures would support the
SNB’s intervention strategy of small but frequent interventions.
4.6 Time of Intervention
Central banks intervene at their own discretion. Figure 3e shows that the maximum
number of SNB interventions occur at 9am and 2pm GMT. Since the majority of
the SNB’s interventions were joint with either the Fed or the Buba or both26, it is
possible that the SNB timed its interventions to coincide with the opening of the
London market and/or the New York markets. The interesting question then is,
do interventions at diﬀerent times of the day have diﬀerent eﬀects on volatility?
I test this by splitting the sample of interventions into two sets, those at 9am
(London open) and those at 2pm (New York open). The results of regressing
exchange rate volatility on these two variables plus a dummy variable to control
for joint interventions are in Table 11. As before the eﬀect of the timing of the
intervention varies with the volatility measure. For the two realised volatility
measures 9am interventions reduce volatility while for the other two measures the
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients have an overall positive eﬀect increasing volatility. 2pm
interventions decrease volatility for both the squared return measures but increase
volatility for both the absolute return measures.
A possible explanation for the positive coeﬃcients is that at opening times there
uncertainty in the market and this leads to increased volatility. Alternatively, it
could also be that the FFF seasonal has failed to capture the opening time volatility
well enough. (reference to models which predict that events during high volume
periods have stronger eﬀects - Maureen O’Hara, Evans and Lyons).
Given that interventions appear to be concentrated around 9am and 2pm, I also
combined morning and afternoon interventions27 to see whether they have diﬀerent
relationships with volatility. The results28 from a regression similar to Eqn. (2)
show that morning and afternoon interventions have a similar eﬀect on volatility
(nearly all the gamma coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant).
4.7 All Characteristics
In an eﬀort assess the combined eﬀect of these diﬀerent characteristics I regressed
the volatility measures on the dummy variables for intervention, intervention size,
frequency, a size-frequency interaction term, 9am interventions, 2pm interventions,
interventions joint with the Fed and interventions joint with the Bundesbank. The
results are in Table 12. Again the results depend on the choice of volatility mea-
sure but the measures are most responsive to interventions that are joint with the
Fed, 2pm interventions and the size of the intervention. Counter intuitively, inter-
ventions that are joint with the Fed increase volatility for all measures except the
squared return measure for which it decreases volatility. For the squared return
26Table 3 gives the number of interventions joint with the Fed only, the Buba only and joint
with both the Fed and the Buba.
27Morning interventions include those from 7am to 10am and afternoon interventions include
interventions from 1pm to 4pm.
28Not presented here for reasons of space
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and absolute return measures interventions that are with the Buba, 9am and 2pm
interventions and the size-frequency interaction term all increase volatility but the
size of the intervention and the frequency of the intervention decreases volatility.
For the two realised volatility measures interventions that are joint with the Buba,
the size and the frequency of the intervention all increase volatility while 2pm inter-
ventions and the size-frequency interaction term both decrease volatility and 9 pm
interventions have no eﬀect on volatility. So if the SNB used the realised volatility
measures we would expect to see them intervening in small quantities frequently or
in one shot with a large quantity and time the intervention for 2pm GMT. If you
used the other two measures, the same strategy would end up increasing exchange
rate volatility. In fact the only thing we can conclude about these measures is that
one shot, small size interventions would decrease volatility.
4.8 Reuters Reports
Since the data on Reuters reports starts Sept 1989, only a sub-sample of the in-
terventions data is used to match the Reuters reports data. The period under
consideration is Sept 1989 - Aug 1995 and during this time the SNB bought USD
on 11 occasions (over 6 diﬀerent days) and sold USD on 47 occasions (over 27
diﬀerent days). See Table 1.
Regressing the volatility measures on a dummy variable for Reuters reports
shows that the news reports have no overall eﬀect on volatility. When split into
reports of buy interventions and those of sell interventions one ﬁnds that reports
of buys are mostly insigniﬁcant while reports of sell interventions have a negative
eﬀect on volatility, mostly anticipated but also with lag for the two realised volatility
measures (Table 13)29. If foreign exchange markets are eﬃcient they should absorb
any new information immediately which makes it puzzling to observe a lagged eﬀect
of the news on volatility. One possible explanation for observing lagged news
eﬀect only for the realised volatility measures is that by construction they have a
lagged structure. On the other hand, the anticipation eﬀect might be indicative of
information leakage, before the report is released. These eﬀects on the timeliness
of the news (comparing the timing of the report to the time of the intervention) are
investigated further in the next sub-section.
These regressions give the impression that reports of buy interventions have a
dissimilar impact than reports of sell interventions. However, testing this explicitly
indicates that reports of buys and reports of sells have the same relationship with
volatility30.
4.9 SNB Interventions and Reuters Reports
Finally, it is interesting to see whether the market reacts to the actual intervention
and news about the intervention. Intuitively, if a Reuters report was released before
the intervention and if markets were eﬃcient we would expect the intervention to
have no impact on volatility since it does not convey new information. If the report
is released after the intervention, then it could still have some eﬀect on volatility
since some market participants may still be unaware of the intervention. The
strength of this eﬀect will depend partly on how soon after the intervention the
report is released. So it is interesting to examine the eﬀect of Reuters reports on
volatility in the presence of the actual intervention. I regress the volatility series
on two dummy variables, one for the actual SNB interventions and the other for
29Only the table with results for the reports of sell interventions is presented for reasons of space.
30The results are not presented here for reasons of space
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Reuters reports31. The results in Table 14 indicate that in the presence of the actual
interventions, Reuters reports have almost no eﬀect on volatility. For the squared
return and both absolute return measures, Reuters reports have a small negative
impact on volatility in contrast to the positive eﬀect of the actual interventions.
To understand this further I split these regressions into buy interventions and buy
reports and sell interventions and sell reports. Looking at Table 15 we can see that
this result is driven entirely by sell side interventions and reports. Reuters reports
of buy interventions have an insigniﬁcant impact on volatility in the presence of the
actual buy interventions while Reuters reports of sell interventions have a signiﬁcant
anticipated and lagged negative impact on volatility.
5 Conclusions
This paper has conducted an event study using the CHFUSD exchange rate and
SNB interventions to study the relationship between the volatility of the exchange
rate and the various characteristics of interventions. Additionally, using Reuters
reports, it studies the impact of the news of these interventions on volatility. The
data set contains information on the size, the direction, the frequency and the exact
time of the intervention making it unique in many ways. The analysis was con-
ducted using four diﬀerent measures of volatility - absolute returns, squared returns,
one hour realised volatility based on absolute returns and one hour realised volatil-
ity based on squared returns. The results vary depending on which measure is used
but there are some general conclusions that can be drawn. With this rich data set
I have identiﬁed that interventions decrease volatility contemporaneously but this
eﬀect is reversed in the two hours afterwards. This is in line with previous empirical
work in the area (e.g. Chang and Taylor 1998 and Dominguez 2003a ﬁnd a positive
relationship between intervention and volatility; Chaboud and LeBaron 1999 ﬁnd
a positive relationship between intervention and trading volume). Further, the
direction of the intervention does not seem to aﬀect volatility. Buy and sell inter-
ventions have similar eﬀects on volatility and the same is true for against-the-wind
and with-the-wind interventions.
The analysis also identiﬁes a lagged negative eﬀect of intervention size for the
absolute return based volatility measures which would support the idea that large
interventions calm markets. On the other hand, for realised volatility based on
squared returns there is no eﬀect at all while for the squared return measure the
lagged eﬀect is positive. There is weak evidence of non-linearity in the size eﬀect.
Further analysis of the volatility and intervention size relationship ﬁnds that as we
move from small to large interventions, the larger interventions tend to increase
volatility relative to small interventions which is counter intuitive. This could be
explained by the market interpreting larger intervention quantities as the central
bank trying to push the exchange rate unsuccessfully, and this negative signal leads
to higher volatility.
The frequency of interventions has a small but positive impact on volatility,
and this is underscored when the analysis is done by splitting the sample into low,
average and high frequency interventions. While small frequency interventions have
no eﬀect on volatility, average and high frequency interventions continue to have a
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect.
The interaction between intervention size and intervention frequency results in
a small positive eﬀect on volatility for the squared return measure and the abso-
lute return measure. This means that for a given intervention size, the higher the
frequency of intervention, the higher the volatility. For both the realised volatility
31Note need to re-run these making the zero for the reports match with the zero for interventions
to make any sensible inference.
12
measures this eﬀect is negative indicating that for a given intervention size or inter-
vention frequency, the higher the other characteristic the lower the volatility. So
using the realised volatility measures would support the SNB’s intervention strategy
of small but frequent interventions.
As before the eﬀect of the timing of the intervention varies with the volatility
measure. After controlling for joint interventions with the Fed and the Buba, I ﬁnd
that for the two realised volatility measures 9am interventions reduce volatility while
for the other two measures the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients have an overall positive eﬀect
increasing volatility. 2pm interventions decrease volatility for both the squared
return measures but increase volatility for both the absolute return measures.
Overall, Reuters reports of interventions do not appear to aﬀect exchange rate
volatility. This result appears to be driven by reports of buy interventions since
reports of sell interventions have a lagged negative impact on volatility. However,
explicit testing of the diﬀerence of these impacts indicates that they are insigniﬁcant.
Further, testing the impact of Reuters reports in the presence of actual interventions
I ﬁnd that Reuters reports have a small but signiﬁcant and lagged negative eﬀect
on volatility for the squared return measure and both the absolute return measures.
This overall eﬀect is driven entirely by reports of sell interventions since reports of
buy interventions are insigniﬁcant in the presence of buy intervention itself.
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Table 1: SNB Interventions
No. of 
interventions
No. of 
intervention 
days
Oct 86 - Aug 95
Total 171 97
Buy 70 33
Sell 101 64
Mar 89 - Aug 95
Total 58 33
Buy 11 6
Sell 47 27
Table 2: Intervention Direction
Daily 1 Week 2 Week 4 Week
Oct 86 - Aug 95
Against-the-wind 86 143 145 146
With-the-wind 85 28 26 25
Mar 89 - Aug 95
Against-the-wind 18 41 41 39
With-the-wind 40 17 17 19
Moving Average
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Table 3: Reuters Reports
Buy Sell
Reuters Reports
Total 16 19
of which Joint 4 2
of which Joint with Fed and Buba 1 1
of which Joint with Fed only 2 0
of which Joint with Buba only 1 1
SNB Interventions 11 47
Reuters
Missed ... 28
False 5 ... 
Figure 1: Exchange Rates: Sep 1986 - Aug 1995
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Table 4: Eﬀect of Interventions on Volatility
volt = α+
8?
i=−8
βi It+i + θ1 volt−1 + θ2 volt−2 + εt
Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
α 0.0012 ** 0.0029 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0026 **
β
−1 -0.0016  -0.0106  -0.0013  -0.0028  
β0 -0.0091 * -0.0208 * -0.0012  0.0017  
β1 -0.0034  -0.0163  -0.0012  -0.0037  
β2 0.0048  0.0156  -0.0004  -0.0041  
β3 0.0267 ** 0.0287 * 0.0017  0.0071  
β4 -0.0362  -0.0056  0.0130 ** 0.0329 **
β5 0.0112  0.0280 * 0.0093 * 0.0305 **
β6 0.0292 ** 0.0269 * -0.0034  -0.0051  
β7 -0.0255  -0.0123  -0.0174 * -0.0053  
β8 0.0721 * 0.0695 ** 0.0674 * 0.0607 **
θ1 1.0368 ** 1.0460 ** 0.1738 ** 0.2373 **
θ2 -0.2466 ** -0.2057 ** 0.0819 * 0.1349 **
Adj R2 0.7172 0.7697 0.0590 0.1059
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility
Note: The coeﬃcient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West standard errors
to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5%
(1%) level. volt is the volatility measure and could be either the realised volatility (defined as the
sum of squared returns for the past hour), or just squared returns or absolute returns. It+i is
the intervention indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB intervenes (whether to buy or sell) and 0
otherwise.
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Table 5: Eﬀect of Direction of Interventions on Volatility - Buy versus Sell Inter-
ventions
volt = α+
8?
j=−8
βj (Bt+j + St+j) +
8?
k=−8
γk St+k + θ1 volt−1 + θ2 volt−2 + εt
Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
α 0.0012 ** 0.0028 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0026 **
γ3 -0.0381  -0.0235  0.0152  0.0160  
γ4 0.1100 * 0.0851  0.0157  0.0339  
γ5 -0.0162  -0.0172  -0.0183 * -0.0286  
γ6 -0.0574 * -0.0384  0.0041  -0.0024  
γ7 0.0650  0.0628 * 0.0482 * 0.0465 *
γ8 -0.1317  -0.0893  -0.1251  -0.0698  
θ1 1.0382 ** 1.0468 ** 0.1736 ** 0.2381 **
θ2 -0.2478 ** -0.2060 ** 0.0836 * 0.1352 **
Adj R2 0.7218 0.7706 0.0719 0.1084
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility
Note: The coeﬃcient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West standard errors
to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5%
(1%) level. volt is the volatility measure and could be either the realised volatility (defined as
the sum of squared returns for the past hour), or just squared returns or absolute returns. Bt+j
(St+j)is the buy (Sell) intervention indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB buys (sells) USD and
0 otherwise. As noted in the main text, the coeﬃcients of interest are the gammas. A non-zero γk
coeﬃcient implies that the two independent variables have diﬀerent relationships with volatility.
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Table 6: Eﬀect of Intervention Size on Volatility
volt = α+
8?
i=−8
βi It+i +
8?
j=−8
γj Qt+j +
8?
k=−8
δk Q2t+k + θ1 volt−1 + θ2 volt−2 + εt
Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
α 0.0012 ** 0.0029 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0026 **
γ
−8 -0.0006  -0.0028  -0.0013  -0.0056 **
γ
−6 0.0003  0.0006  0.0012 * 0.0034  
γ0 -0.0018  -0.0075 * -0.0011  -0.0048 *
γ5 0.0051  0.0063  0.0045 * 0.0076 *
γ6 -0.0086  -0.0114 * -0.0025  -0.0027  
δ
−8 0.0000  0.0001 ** 0.0000 * 0.0002 **
δ
−6 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 * -0.0001  
δ
−1 -0.0001 * -0.0002 * 0.0000  -0.0001  
δ0 0.0001 * 0.0002 ** 0.0000  0.0001 *
δ1 0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  -0.0001 **
δ2 -0.0001 * -0.0001  0.0000  0.0001  
δ3 0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001 *
δ5 -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0001 ** -0.0002 **
δ6 0.0002 * 0.0004 ** 0.0001 * 0.0002  
θ1 1.0371 ** 1.0474 ** 0.1736 ** 0.2378 **
θ2 -0.2468 ** -0.2068 ** 0.0829 * 0.1364 **
Adj R2 0.7176 0.7705 0.0600 0.1092
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility
Note: The coeﬃcient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West standard errors
to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5%
(1%) level. volt is the volatility measure and could be either the realised volatility (defined as the
sum of squared returns for the past hour), or just squared returns or absolute returns. It+i is
the intervention indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB intervenes (whether to buy or sell) and 0
otherwise. Qt+j is the absolute magnitude of USD bought or sold by the SNB and Q2t+k is the
squared quantity.
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Table 7: Eﬀect of Intervention Size on Volatility: Small, Average and Large Size
Interventions
volt = α+
8?
i=−8
βi It+i+
8?
j=−8
γj SQt+j+
8?
k=−8
δk AQt+k+
8?
l=−8
φl LQt+l+θ1 volt−1+θ2 volt−2+εt
Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
α 0.0012 ** 0.0029 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0026 **
β -0.1454 -0.1108 -0.1291 -0.0702
γ 0.0162 0.0496 0.0111 0.0308
δ 0.0116 0.0324 0.0117 0.0200
φ 0.0081 0.0152 0.0037 0.0141
θ1 1.0368 ** 1.0468 ** 0.1735 ** 0.2375 **
θ2 -0.2464 ** -0.2061 ** 0.0823 * 0.1365 **
Adj R2 0.7177 0.7707 0.0600 0.1096
Volatility Measure (sum of significant coefficients)
Realised Volatility
Note: The coeﬃcient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West standard errors to
correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The sum of significant coeﬃcients is based on
those that are significant at 5% or 1%. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5% (1%) level. volt
is the volatility measure and could be either the realised volatility (defined as the sum of squared
returns for the past hour), or just squared returns or absolute returns. SQt+j is an indicator
for small magnitude interventions which are defined as sales or purchases of up to 5 mil USD,
AQt+k is an indicator for interventions between 5 and 10 mil USD and LQt+l is an indicator
for interventions that are larger than 10 mil USD. With this classification there are 27 small, 26
average and 5 large interventions.
21
Table 8: Eﬀect of Intervention Frequency on Volatility
volt = α+
8?
i=−8
βi It+i +
8?
j=−8
γj Ft+j + θ1 volt−1 + θ2 volt−2 + εt
Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
α 0.0012 ** 0.0028 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0026 **
γ
−8 -0.0024 * -0.0074 ** -0.0003  -0.0019  
γ
−6 0.0016  0.0056 * 0.0000  -0.0005  
γ
−4 0.0027  0.0061 * 0.0032 * 0.0087 **
γ1 0.0036 * 0.0076 * 0.0003  0.0019  
γ2 0.0078 ** 0.0139 ** 0.0021  0.0034  
γ3 0.0039  0.0074 * 0.0032  0.0067 *
γ4 -0.0020  0.0007  0.0069 ** 0.0130 **
γ6 -0.0016  -0.0061  -0.0050 ** -0.0078 **
γ8 0.0054  0.0090  0.0101  0.0122 *
θ1 1.0356 ** 1.0442 ** 0.1720 ** 0.2350 **
θ2 -0.2461 ** -0.2045 ** 0.0828 * 0.1355 **
Adj R2 0.7177 0.7706 0.0628 0.1106
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility
Note: The coeﬃcient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West standard errors
to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5%
(1%) level. volt is the volatility measure and could be either the realised volatility (defined as the
sum of squared returns for the past hour), or just squared returns or absolute returns. It+i is
the intervention indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB intervenes (whether to buy or sell) and 0
otherwise. Ft+j is a dummy variable for the frequency of the intervention.
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Table 9: Eﬀect of Intervention Frequency on Volatility: Low, Average and High
Frequency Interventions
volt = α+
8?
i=−8
βi It+i+
8?
j=−8
γj LFt+j+
8?
k=−8
δk AFt+k+
8?
l=−8
φl HFt+l+θ1 volt−1+θ2 volt−2+εt
Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
α 0.0012 ** 0.0028 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0026 **
β … -0.0376 … …
γ 0.0053 0.0402 … 0.0303
δ 0.0049 0.0054 0.0143 0.0178
φ 0.0071 0.0235 0.0085 0.0279
θ1 1.0362 ** 1.0434 ** 0.1712 ** 0.2343 **
θ2 -0.2466 ** -0.2035 ** 0.0821 * 0.1343 **
Adj R2 0.7204 0.7718 0.0676 0.1128
Realised Volatility
Volatility Measure (sum of significant coefficients)
Note: The coeﬃcient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West standard errors to
correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The sum of significant coeﬃcients is based on
those that are significant at 5% or 1%. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5% (1%) level. volt
is the volatility measure and could be either the realised volatility (defined as the sum of squared
returns for the past hour), or just squared returns or absolute returns. It+i is the intervention
indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB intervenes (whether to buy or sell) and 0 otherwise. LFt+j
is an indicator for low Frequency interventions (between 1 and 6 times in 15 minutes), AFt+k is
an indicator for intervention frequency between 7 and 12 times in 15 minutes and HFt+l is an
indicator for frequency of interventions larger than 13. With this classification there are 44 low,
12 average and 2 high frequency interventions.
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Table 10: Eﬀect of Intervention Size and Frequency on Volatility
volt = α+
8?
i=−8
βi It+i+
8?
j=−8
γj Qt+j+
8?
k=−8
δk Ft+k+
8?
l=−8
φl Qt+l∗Ft+l+θ1 volt−1+θ2 volt−2+εt
Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
α 0.0012 ** 0.0028 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0026 **
γ
−3 0.0010  0.0043 * 0.0004  0.0016  
γ
−2 0.0029 ** 0.0054 ** 0.0009  0.0023  
γ
−1 -0.0014 * -0.0040  0.0005  0.0010  
γ1 -0.0009  -0.0036 * -0.0009 ** -0.0035 **
γ2 -0.0032  -0.0046  -0.0024 ** -0.0043 *
γ3 0.0018  0.0046 ** 0.0013  0.0038 *
δ
−2 0.0086 ** 0.0148 * 0.0020  0.0046  
δ
−1 -0.0036  -0.0121 * 0.0011  -0.0005  
δ2 -0.0020  0.0012  -0.0063 * -0.0109 *
δ3 0.0070  0.0167 * 0.0049  0.0120  
φ
−2 -0.0009 ** -0.0018 ** -0.0002  -0.0007  
φ2 0.0009  0.0011  0.0008 ** 0.0014 **
φ3 -0.0003  -0.0009 * -0.0001  -0.0004  
θ1 1.0350 ** 1.0446 ** 0.1714 ** 0.2354 **
θ2 -0.2453 ** -0.2045 ** 0.0836 * 0.1367 **
Adj R2 0.7181 0.7711 0.0635 0.1128
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility
Note: The coeﬃcient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West standard errors
to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5%
(1%) level. volt is the volatility measure and could be either the realised volatility (defined as
the sum of squared returns for the past hour), or just squared returns or absolute returns. It+i
is the intervention indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB intervenes (whether to buy or sell)
and 0 otherwise. Qt+j is the absolute magnitude of USD bought or sold by the SNB, Ft+k is a
dummy variable for the frequency of the intervention and Qt+l ∗Ft+l is a dummy variable for the
size-frequency interaction.
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Table 11: Eﬀect of Time of Interventions on Volatility: 9am versus 2pm
volt = α+
8?
i=−8
βi 9amt+i +
8?
j=−8
γj 2pmt+j +
8?
k=−8
δk Jt+k + θ1 volt−1 + θ2 volt−2 + εt
Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
α 0.0014 ** 0.0032 ** 0.0011 ** 0.0029 **
β
−8 -0.0119 ** -0.0186  -0.0117 ** -0.0177  
β
−6 -0.0081 ** -0.0267 * -0.0069 ** -0.0214 **
β0 -0.0080  -0.0127  0.0071  0.0282 *
β4 0.0156  0.0595  0.0237 ** 0.0631 **
γ
−5 -0.0071  -0.0211  -0.0083 ** -0.0251 **
γ
−2 0.0054  0.0293 * -0.0013  0.0095  
γ3 0.0373  0.0441 * 0.0003  0.0090  
γ6 0.0456 ** 0.0526 ** -0.0007  0.0091  
γ7 -0.0724 * -0.0508  -0.0294 * -0.0202  
γ8 0.0829  0.0726  0.0819  0.0753 *
δ0 0.0240  0.0587 * 0.0049  0.0390  
δ7 0.0348  0.0622 * -0.0076  0.0093  
δ8 0.1056  0.1413 * 0.0795  0.1171 *
θ1 1.0448 ** 1.0507 ** 0.1786 ** 0.2406 **
θ2 -0.2549 ** -0.2101 ** 0.0763  0.1317 **
Adj R2 0.7186 0.7702 0.0566 0.1049
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility
Note: The coeﬃcient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West standard errors
to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5%
(1%) level. volt is the volatility measure and could be either the realised volatility (defined as the
sum of squared returns for the past hour), or just squared returns or absolute returns. 9amt+i is a
dummy variable for interventions occurring at 9am, 2pmt+j is a dummy variable for interventions
occurring at 2pm and Jt+k is a dummy variable that controls for interventions that were joint
with either the Fed or the Buba or both.
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Table 12: Eﬀect of Diﬀerent Intervention Characteristics on Volatility
volt = α+
8?
i=−8
βi It+i +
8?
j=−8
γj Qt+j +
8?
k=−8
δk Ft+k +
8?
l=−8
ηl Qt+l ∗ Ft+l...
+
8?
m=−8
κm 9amt+m +
8?
n=−8
λn 2pmt+n...
+
8?
p=−8
µp Fedt+p +
8?
q=−8
φq Bubat+q + θ1 volt−1 + θ2 volt−2 + εt
Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
α 0.0012 ** 0.0028 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0026 **
β -0.0334 … -0.0226 -0.0674
γ 0.0028 0.0139 -0.0019 -0.0036
δ 0.0083 0.0281 -0.0059 -0.0102
η -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0008 0.0013
κ 0.0201 … 0.0342 0.0448
λ -0.0993 -0.0786 0.0020 0.0317
µ 0.6046 0.6472 0.3881 0.3245
φ 0.0668 0.1630 0.1059 0.2335
θ1 1.0367 ** 1.0423 ** 0.1697 * 0.2334 **
θ2 -0.2474 ** -0.2020 ** 0.0848 * 0.1366 **
Adj R2 0.7312 0.7744 0.1018 0.1234
Realised Volatility
Volatility Measure (sum of significant coefficients)
Note: The coeﬃcient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West standard errors to
correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The sum of significant coeﬃcients is based on
those that are significant at 5% or 1%. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5% (1%) level. volt
is the volatility measure and could be either the realised volatility (defined as the sum of squared
returns for the past hour), or just squared returns or absolute returns. It+i is the intervention
indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB intervenes (whether to buy or sell) and 0 otherwise. Qt+j
is the absolute magnitude of USD bought or sold by the SNB, Ft+k is a dummy variable for the
frequency of the intervention, Qt+l ∗ Ft+l is a dummy variable for the size-frequency interaction.,
9amt+i is a dummy variable for interventions occurring at 9am, 2pmt+j is a dummy variable for
interventions occurring at 2pm, Fedt+p is a dummy variable that controls for interventions that
were joint with the Fed and Bubat+q is a dummy variable that controls for interventions that were
joint with the Bundesbank.
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Table 13: Eﬀect of Reuters Reports of Sell Interventions on Volatility
volt = α+
8?
i=−8
βi RSt+i + θ1 volt−1 + θ2 volt−2 + εt
Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
α 0.0001  0.0003  0.0001  0.0002  
β
−8 -0.0060 ** -0.0150  -0.0066 ** -0.0187 *
β
−7 -0.0045  -0.0085  -0.0026  -0.0048  
β
−6 -0.0044  -0.0057  -0.0031  -0.0054  
β
−5 -0.0060  -0.0217  -0.0055 * -0.0179  
β
−4 -0.0096  -0.0442 * -0.0051 * -0.0151  
β
−3 -0.0071  -0.0162  -0.0025  -0.0109  
β
−2 0.0054  0.0019  -0.0025  -0.0155  
β
−1 -0.0040  0.0025  -0.0014  -0.0049  
β0 0.0083  0.0455 * 0.0060  0.0321  
β1 0.0093  0.0047  0.0063  0.0117  
β2 -0.0077  -0.0056  -0.0048  -0.0052  
β3 0.0054  -0.0043  0.0043  -0.0026  
β4 -0.0090 ** -0.0360 * -0.0033  -0.0178  
β5 -0.0003  0.0115  -0.0041  0.0000  
β6 -0.0074  -0.0257  0.0015  -0.0094  
β7 0.0075  0.0115  -0.0011  -0.0007  
β8 0.0079  0.0124  0.0064  0.0171  
θ1 1.0666 ** 1.0539 ** 0.2037 ** 0.2148 **
θ2 -0.2702 ** -0.2297 ** 0.0591 ** 0.0931 **
Adj R2 0.7266 0.7485 0.0501 0.0642
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility
Note: The coeﬃcient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West standard errors
to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5%
(1%) level. volt is the volatility measure and could be either the realised volatility (defined as the
sum of squared returns for the past hour), or just squared returns or absolute returns. RSt+i is
a dummy variable which is 1 whenever there is a Reuters report that the SNB sold USD and 0
otherwise.
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Table 14: Eﬀect of SNB Interventions and Reuters Reports on Volatility
volt = α+
8?
i=−8
βi It+i +
8?
j=−8
γj RRt+j + θ1 volt−1 + θ2 volt−2 + εt
Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
α 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  
β
−3 0.0060  0.0275 * 0.0031  0.0185  
β3 0.0503 ** 0.0735 ** 0.0150 * 0.0383 **
β4 -0.0606  -0.0164  0.0229 ** 0.0526 **
β5 0.0132  0.0328  0.0007  0.0280 *
β6 0.0497 * 0.0520 ** -0.0023  0.0085  
β7 -0.0511  -0.0228  -0.0237  -0.0083  
β8 0.1189 * 0.1221 * 0.1124 * 0.1102 *
γ
−5 -0.0086  -0.0354 * -0.0090 * -0.0243 *
γ4 -0.0419  -0.0592  -0.0132 * -0.0204  
θ1 1.0677 ** 1.0535 ** 0.2033 ** 0.2137 **
θ2 -0.2724 ** -0.2303 ** 0.0583 ** 0.0921 **
Adj R2 0.7281 0.7489 0.0547 0.0661
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility
Note: The coeﬃcient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West standard errors
to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5%
(1%) level. volt is the volatility measure and could be either the realised volatility (defined as the
sum of squared returns for the past hour), or just squared returns or absolute returns. It+i is
the intervention indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB intervenes (whether to buy or sell) and 0
otherwise and RRt+j is a dummy variable indicating when there is a Reuters report of an SNB
intervention.
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Table 15: Eﬀect of Sell Interventions and Sell Reports on Volatility
volt = α+
8?
i=−8
βi ISt+i +
8?
j=−8
γj RSt+j + θ1 volt−1 + θ2 volt−2 + εt
Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
α 0.0001  0.0002  0.0001  0.0002  
β
−3 0.0070  0.0295 * 0.0004  0.0132  
β0 -0.0089  -0.0097  0.0053  0.0277 *
β2 0.0136  0.0461 * 0.0090  0.0225  
β3 0.0280 ** 0.0591 ** 0.0125 * 0.0313 *
β4 0.0083  0.0471  0.0280 ** 0.0708 **
β5 0.0156 * 0.0440 ** 0.0060  0.0354 **
β6 0.0146 * 0.0341  0.0071  0.0122  
β8 0.0360 * 0.0541 * 0.0289  0.0484 *
γ
−8 -0.0063 ** -0.0171 * -0.0072 ** -0.0233 *
γ
−6 -0.0076 * -0.0138  -0.0072 * -0.0155  
γ
−5 -0.0115 * -0.0349 * -0.0103 ** -0.0307 **
γ
−4 -0.0107  -0.0494 * -0.0094 ** -0.0276 *
γ4 -0.0176 ** -0.0533 ** -0.0088  -0.0294 *
γ6 -0.0160 ** -0.0445 ** -0.0053  -0.0262  
θ1 1.0664 ** 1.0533 ** 0.2035 ** 0.2141 **
θ2 -0.2703 ** -0.2296 ** 0.0589 ** 0.0926 **
Adj R2 0.7267 0.7486 0.0506 0.0651
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility
Note: The coeﬃcient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West standard errors
to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5%
(1%) level. volt is the volatility measure and could be either the realised volatility (defined as the
sum of squared returns for the past hour), or just squared returns or absolute returns. ISt+i is
the intervention indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB sells USD and 0 otherwise and RSt+j is
a dummy variable which is 1 whenever there is a Reuters report that the SNB sold USD and 0
otherwise.
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Figure 2: Intraday Seasonality and the Flexible Fourier Transform
a. Absolute Returns c. Sum of Absolute Returns
b. Squared Returns d. Sum of Squared Returns
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Figure 3: Characterising SNB Interventions
a. By Year b. By Day of Week
c. By Size d. By Frequency
e. By Time of Day
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